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STATG!ENT CJF NATURE OF CASE 
!'his is an action to determine the location of the 
, q,Lir«' line between real property m·med by Plaintiffs and that 
,,.,1 1~,: b,; Defendants, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the court sitting without a jury, 
_,; ter hearing the evidence, the court determined that the boundary 
_ 1 ;1e between the properties owned by Plaintiffs and Defendants 
;a~ in fact the boundary line set forth in the deed from 
l,Jilliam L. Adams and Lizy W, Adams to J, Harold Mitchell as 
~escr•~ed in Plaintiff's exhibit 4. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendants-Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment 
'" the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except as hereinafter set forth, the Defendants-Respondents 
~c~ept the statement of facts as set forth in the Appellant's 
Brief at Pages 2 through 8. 
Beginning at page 3, third paragraph, of the Appellant's 
Brief, Appellant states as facts statements which were excluded 
bv the court at trial based upon Plaintiff's objections which 
·ere sustained by the court. The Appellant sets forth as facts 
in his brief those statements made by Harold Mitchell with 
:e.pect to conversations he allegedly had with William L. Adams 
~ho is deceased. It cannot properly be said that the items set 
'or~h beginning with the third paragraph of page 3 and continuing 
:~rough the first paragraph of page 5 are facts. The statements 
'.".dde l herein merely reflect a proffer made by the Plaintiffs-
'ccel lants at trial after the court had ruled that such evidence 
'1"' 111admissable under the Dead Man's Statute, here say, parol 
··dence and the Statute of Frauds. 
1 
The evidence is clear that J. H~uold ttitchell al !1i1 
expense in 1948 constructed the wire mesh fence, • ..;hiceh r '"' 
subject of this lawsuit, for the purpose of containin1; hi .: , , 
and that said fence was used as a livestock fence. (TP l't' ! l l' 
54-55) The evidence is clear from :tr. J. Harold ctitchell ""' 
built the fence prior to the time that the deed to thc- [H<'l"'1 · 
was exchanged between Mr. Adams and Mr. ~1itchell. (TR l'.)'11 
The wire fence in fact has been in existence since 1940. 
(TR PP.55-56) 
The court, based on the Defendant's Motion to Strike, Jnd 
pursuant to its ruling that such evidence was inadmissable 
under the Dead Man's Statute, parol evidence rule, the SLHur~ 
of Frauds, and heresay excluded all testimony by J. Harold 1:11.c'c. 
as to statements made by :!r. Adams prior to the exchanginR ·f 
the deed. The evidence is clear that the wire fence was rui Ir 
by J. Harold Mitchell at his expense and without any help or 
participation of Mr. Adams. (TR P.69, Ln. 10-20). After 
stating that he had erected the fence without any help of 
Mr. Adams, in 1948, Mr. Mitchell then testified that the deeJ 
(P. 4) from t!r. Adams to Mr. Mi tche 11 was prepared and gi •;en 
to him on or about the date on the deed which is September !S 
1949. (See ex. P.4; TR. P.60, Ln. 15-20). Mr. Mitchell further 
stated that he read the description on the deed, and altho112 11 
he felt there was a problem with the description, he did not 
ask Mr. Adams to revise the deed but went ahead and recorded 
the deed with the property description the way it was. 
(TR P.61, Ln. 1-7) Mr. Mitchell further testified that he 
knew there was no description in the deed having any referenc·c 
to an existing fence line. (TR P.61, Ln. 8-10) Mr. Mitchell 
further testified that at the time he accepted the deed frum 
Mr. Adams and had it recorded it was his intention that hcc 1rn 1 
receive the property described in the deed and that what is 
described in the deed is all that he expected to recei'.1 e .!t 
that time. (TR P.67, Ln. 15-23) :tr. J. Harold :-1itchell f11rr 1·cc 
testified that while there had never been any protests c~~r 11 ' 
2 
Joe of rhe fence as a boundary, he had never talked to the owners 
in the •Jther side of the fence about the use of the fence as 
1 
1,ounJary. (TR P. 58, Ln. 1-6). At page 6 of Appellant's Brief, 
\ppel l:rnt makes the statement "None of the parties or their 
i·rc le1:essors in interest, were aware that there was a difference 
:>ct•ceen the fence line and the survey line until that time." 
\Referring to a survey made in 1977.) Appellant then cites the 
1
ranscript at pages 64 through 110, or 46 pages of the transcript. 
T~is statement made by the Appellant assumes that there is 
e•idence other than that of J. Harold Mitchell that the fence line 
1n fact was considered to be the boundary line. However, the 
restimony in the case was that the only person who ever considered 
the fence line to be the boundary line was J. Harold Mitchell, and 
'.-!r. Mitchell admitted in his direct examination that he had not 
diocussed the fence as a boundary line with the owners on the other 
;ide of the fence. (TR P. 56, Ln. 4-6). Thus we have a situation 
•.,·here Mr. J. Harold Mitchell in his own mind is considering the 
~ence line as a boundary, but never conveys this thought to any 
other persons, and then counsel for Appellants states that none 
nf the parties nor their predecessors in interest were aware 
there was a difference between the fence line and the survey 
line until the survey of 1977. Appellant's Brief at page 6. 
~ere was no issue in the case in this regard and it is not a 
fact that no one considered there was a difference between the 
fence line and the survey line until 1977. No one except 
:tr. '.'iitchell ever considered the fence as the boundary line until 
the Notice of Interest was filed by the Plaintiffs in this action. 
Thus the only facts which are at issue in the case, and 
~hich were not excluded as a result of the court's evidentary 
ruling, were that the owners of the property by deed conveyed 
to J. Harold Mitchell in September, 1949, a portion of the property. 
The tence, which is the subject matter of this litigation was 
erected in 1948 and was in existence at the time of the deed 
)e i ng drc1wn issued and recorded, but there is no reference in 
' •e deed to the fence line being any part of the property line to 




J. HAROLD MITCHELL' s TESTIMONY CONCERNING STATE:ll::rr:; I•] 
WILLIAM L. ADAMS OfFERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOHI:~G Tl!AT T'11: 
BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE PROPERTY IS OTHER THAN AS DE:;cr,1 c;;:: I 
THE DEED FROM WILLIA.t'I L. ADAMS TO J. HAROLD ~!ITCHELL ',·1A:, !'RI 
EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
At trial, the Plaintiffs offered evidence from J. ILiroLI 
Mitchell with regard to conversations that Mr. Mitchell claimc, 
to have had with his grantor, William L. Adams, prior to 
and contemporaneous with the preparation execution and recorJine 
of the deed of September 15, 1949 (P.4). Mr. Mitchell claimed 
that prior to the preparation of the deed, Mr. Adams agreed tha: 
the wire mesh fence which had been erected by J. Harold ~!i tchel'. 
would be the boundary line between the property, and that not-
withstanding the metes and bounds set forth in the deed, that 
Mr. Adams agreed at the time of delivery of the deed that the 
fence line in fact would be the property line. 
Defendants properly objected to the testimony of J. Harold 
Mitchell with respect to the claimed conversations he had haJ 
with Mr. Adams on the basis of the Dead Man's Statute, the paro. 
evidence rule, and heresay. (TR. P. 54, Ln. 6-9). 
What we have in the present case is a situation where d 
party to a deed which was executed and recorded approximatelv Jj 
years ago comes into court and attempts to vary the terms of L~c 
deed by giving testimony that the grantor of the deed, who l· 
deceased, made an agreement with him that notwithstanding t~e 
language of the deed, the boundary line was to be other than --
described in the deed. Acceptance in this case, of parol 
evidence with respect to such an agreement that the boundarv l;r-: 
set forth in the deed is other than as set forth, would givE t. 
the grantee properties other than those set forth by the rc1~3 
the deed. This is the very type of situation which the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of :-laxfield v. Sainsburv, 11) lJtah 'SI 
172 P. 2d 122 (1946) held was covered by the Dead '.·Ian' .s ~' ,, 
The court in the Sainsburv case said that the purpose uf r_llf' 
Man's Statute was to guard against the temptation to give fJ 1 -· 
testimony in regard to a transaction of a deceased pcrs m !• · t' '' 
surviving party when the transaction was involved in a ~c1-..sJl'. 
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111 ,1 ,;c:,JL 11 i1JJ :;ed I cd th<c mouth of the other party. It is clear 
, ,, 1 ,, 1 ., c""'" '"hi le lne Defen<.iants are in fact heirs of William 
m. Lhe properly in question did not go to the Defendants by 
·'"' uf int c:sldte succession or by a Will but was deeded to the 
,,,1,ia11L:, prior to the death of William Adams. Appellant argues 
[,,1· the De:.id >!an' s Statutes to :.ipply, the property in 
··';on must p:.iss either by Will or intestate succession. How-
' 1· Lit<' statute does not so say, but states merely that the class 
pvrsuns tu whom it applies are those who are heirs of tne dead 
;crsun, or grantees of heirs of the dead person, a situation which 
.leJrl~ is present in this case. In order for the court to deter-
'.Tllllt' ,.;hether or not the Dead Man's Statute would properly exclude 
: 1 iJ e·. iJence, the court must determine the policy matters involved 
,nJ decide whether or not it is a necessary prerequisite to 
;sert1un of the Dead Man's Statute that the heirs receive property 
either by Will or by operation of law at the death of the owner, 
or whether or not they merely need be within the statutory class 
.1 heirs of the deceased party before they can assert the Dead 
:C,n' s Statute. 
As stated in the Sainsbury case, supra, tne purpose is to pre-
,iuoe the temptation to give false testimony with regard to a 
·rdnodction by a surviving party where the mouth of the deceased 
,.,ny 1s sealed, then it would seem that the evidence in this case 
•d• properly excluded in line with said legislative and judicial 
However, even if the court were to determine that the Dead 
.Jn's Slatute does not properly apply in this case, the said 
evidence proffered by Plaintiff is properly excluded as heresay, 
1nder the Statute of Frauds, and as parol evidence offered for the 
r1Jrp11se uf varying the terms of an unambiguous deed. 
It is a universally accepted proposition that where the 
ncscription of the properties conveyed in a deed is definice, 
•. ,rt.nn. :.ind unambiguous, extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced 
·'''''" t licit it was the intention of the grantor to convey a 
'·' rt'tlcl' tract. Nor can either party show by extrinsic evidence 
'" more ur less property than that described in the deed was 
-Lc· 11 J"J Lo be passed by the parties. See Generally 23 AH. Jur. 2d 
'•his, §2511. ;ieilher parol evidence nor surrounding facts and 
rcurnstdnces can properly be considered for the purpose of adding 
cte:racLing from, or varying the terms of a deed which is plain. 
5 
certain and unambiguous with respect to the estate conveveJ 
thereby. See Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P. 2d 979 (Utah 19701. 
Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 460 (1924); French v. Brinkmdn, 
I'. 
35 Cal. RPTR. 289, 387 P. 2d 1 (1963); Potter v. Northern :Jat•i 
Gas Company, 201 Kansas 528, 441 P. 2d 802 (1968), Rock_ B 
149 Mont. 449, 429 P. 2d 634 (1967), McSpa<len v. Mahonv !,Jl 
(Okla. 1967). A most recent Utah case with respect to th1 
question is the case of Neely v. Kelsch, supra, wherein tl1c , · ir' 
considered the question of whether or not extrinsic evidPnce 
could be admitted for the purpose of varying the deed which in 
fact had been recorded. In that case the court held that i~ '" 
where the case was one for reformation of the deed based on 
mutual mistake, which is not the issue in this case, parol e•·idcc .. 
could be received to prove that in fact there had been a mistake 
but that the mistake must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence. In the present case we merely have a situation where 
35 years after the fact, a party now seeks to assert that a 
deceased granter agreed that a deed which had been prepared anci 
was recorded would not in fact set forth the boundaries of the 
property, but that the property would be bounded pursuant to an 
agreement made between himself. and the grantee which was ne•·e:: 
reduced to writing and which was in conflict with the expressed 
description set forth in the deed. 
At page 29 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant cites the case 
of Security Leasing Company v. Flintco for the proposition th~t 
the terms and intentions of a party to a writing are merged into 
the writing itself. This is a commonly accepted principle o~ 
law and the parol evidence rule is designed to protect the 
proposition that the agreements of a party are in fact merged 
into the written document. In this case, it is clear and 
undisputed that the parties agreed a portion of the propertv 
was to be partitioned off and deeded to J. Harold Mitchell b1 
William Adams. The testimony is further clear and the evi<ler:.·,• 
is undisputed that Mr. Adams on his own took measurements anJ 
erected a fence by himself at his own cost and subsequent t:·J 
its erection used the fence for the purpose of containing Ii 
stock to be grazed on his property. The evidence is un<l i: r·· 
that the fence was in existence for at least a year priur ro 1 '1< 
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l tm<' cli.il lhe deeds were prepared and recorded. Mr. Mitchell 
~tshes to tcslify that at the time the deeds were presented, 
l·c· recugnizcd that the deeds did not describe the property that 
,, felt should be his, but that notwithstanding this fact, and 
,,~iLhstanding the fact that it would be a relatively simple 
c.s~ lo use the fence line as part of the description of the 
?' ·perlv being conveyed, he accepted the deed as it was given 
,,, him, accepted the fact that it conveyed tne property that he 
[elt he was entitled to, and that he then went and recorded 
Lile deed notwithstanding the alleged verbal agreement he claims 
i1e made with Mr. Adams. The testimony in the case is undisputed 
:hat t~c fence was used as a livestock fence from the time it 
was erected in 1948 until approximately the mid 1970's and 
:~at the fence was taken up and put down annually at the con-
venience of the parties and for the purpose of containing live-
s tock. There is no evidence in the case other than from the 
~uuth of J. Harold Mitchell that anyone other than J. Harold 
Nilchell ever considered the fence to be a boundary fence. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the court 
properly excluded the testimony of J. Harold Mitchell with 
respect to the alleged agreements he had with the grantor which 
~ould vary the property description as set forth in the deed. 
le stretches the credibility of everyone to think that where 
Lhe alleged boundary fence was in existence at the time the 
deed was prepared, that if the parties in fact intended the 
o,undary line to be the fence, it would not have been described 
in the deed as in fact being the boundary line between the 
properties. Where in fact the fence existed at the point in 
time when the deed was prepared, and the fence was not described 
as the boundary, but the boundary was described by surveyed 
meteo and bounds, such clearly argues for the proposition that 
ir '.vas never the intention of the parties that the livestock 
tence be the boundary line. It was clearly the intention of the 
'.!es that the property described in the deed was in fact the 
01 "1•<.:rt y being conveyed and the fence was never considered, at 
c1e lime, by the grantor as the boundary. 
7 
POI'.'JT I I 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS DID ;WT ESTABLISH THAT THE FE::1 L 
LINE WAS IN FACT THE ACQUIESSED IN BOUNDARY LINE BLTWEEI•: l'lciJl'i 1 
Appellants claim that the evidence in the case sh'''" : , ,, 
the livestock fence erected in 1948, by J. Harold ~itchell 
acquiessed in by the Defendants and their predecessors in 
interest of such a long period of time that the said fence 1n 
fact became the boundary line between the two properties. T!,, 
evidence which was admitted in the case shows that in the Spri 11,· 
or early Summer of 1948 the property in question was uwneu 
jointly by William Adams and J. Harold Mitchell, each havin~ '" 
undivided interest in the whole. J. Harold Mitchell un his C•'"' 
took measurements and constructed a fence to contain his sheep 
in an area of roughly 19 acres. On September 15, 1949, the 
property was partitioned by deed, and the deed having been de-
livered to J. Harola Mitchell was then recorded. ~Ir. :-litc:1ed' 
share of the undivided whole was set forth by a metes and b,Ju~.1J• 
description and no reference to the fence was contained in Lhe 
deed. The fence was taken up and put down annually and used 
needed until 1978 as a livestock fence. It was put up when 
needed, and let down when not needed. No discussions were c:•.cr 
had between J. Harold Mitchell and any of Plaintiss's pred•-
cessors with respect to the fact that the fence was a boundar~ 
during the period from 1949, after the recording of the deed, 
and 1978. The Plaintiffs in this case have the burden to col> 
all the necessary elements to show boundary by acquiescence hH '1 ' 
they can prevail on their claim that the fence line is the 
boundary line between the properties of the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants. Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadows Ranches, 
639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981). In the case of ~!adsen v. Clegg,, >' 
726 (Utah 1981) the court stated: 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
has long been recognized, and wnen the 
location of the true boundary between 
adjoining tracts of land is unknown, un-
certain, or in dispute, the owners thercul, 
may, by parol agreement, establish the 
boundary line and thereby irrevocably binu 
themselves and their grantees ~wever _ \·.'!w[1 
the true 
8 
boundary is known, any parol agreement 
of the owners establishing the boundary 
line elsewhere is void and unenforceable 
by virtue of the Statute of Frauds, 
which requires a conveyance of real property 
to be in writing. 
This court had determined that the absence 
of an express agreement as to the location 
of the boundaries between adjoining owners, 
the law will imply an agreement fixing 
the boundary as located, if it can do so 
consistently with the facts appearing. 
However, when the evidence fails to 
support any implication that a fence has 
been erected by adjoining owners pursuant 
to an agreement between them as to the 
location of the boundary, the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence has no application. 
In an earlier case this court cautioned: 
We do not wish to be understood 
as holding that the parties may 
now claim to the true boundary, 
where an assumed or agreed boundary 
is located through mistake or 
inadvertance, or where it is clear 
that the line that's located was not 
intended as a boundary, and where a 
boundary so located has not been 
acquiessed in for a long term of 
years by the parties in interest. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff showed that no 
uncertainty or dispute existed concerning the 
location of the boundary line at the time the 
1904 fence was constructed. The 1904 deeds to 
Plaintiffs and Defendants predecessors 
unmistakably defined a boundary which takes a 
substantial jog northward at its eastern end. 
Defendant has raised no question concerning 
the validity of these deeds; nor has he 
shown any subsequent conveyance by Plaintiff 
or his father which might cast doubt on 
Plaintiff's present title. The trial court 
did not include in its findings any indication 
that the boundary was disputed when Plaintiff's 
father built the fence or that the fence was 
intended originally as a boundary line. In 
the absence of any initial uncertainty con-
cerning the ownership of the property in 
question, the Doctrine of Boundary by 
acquiescence has ~lication. 
Even if the trial court has found that 
uncertainty existed concerning the correct 
boundary line, it could not have resolved 
such uncertainty on the basis of Defendant's 
9 
acquiescence theory, because the 
evidence simply fails to support any 
finding on an agreement between the 
parties. 639 P.2d 729-30 (emphasis added) 
In the present case the evidence is clear. The fence wa• 
put up initially for stock control, not as a boundary. ,\t lhc 
time of its erection, there was no uncertainty as to a bounJd•'. 
At the time that J. Harold Mitchell constructed the fence, ht" 
interest was "an undivided interest" in the whole parcel. The 
division of the property and the preparation of the deed grant1n_ 
to him his portion of the undivided interest did not take place 
until over a year later. At the time that the fence was con-
structed, J. Harold Mitchell had an undivided interest in 
property on both sides of the fence line. This court has hel~ 
that in a situation where the same party owns property on both 
sides of a fence at the time the fence is constructed, it cannot 
be said that the fence is a boundary. As observed by this 
Honorable Court in Homeowners Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 
105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (1943): 
It could hardly be said that a highway 
boundary line could have been erected 
to settle a dispute between adjoining 
land owners when the lands on both 
sides of the road were owned by the same 
person. 
The same can be said in the instant case. It cannot be 
said that a livestock fence erected prior to the division of 
properties was erected for the purpose of settling a boundar~ 
dispute when no dispute existed at the time the fence was 
erected and when both parties held an undivided interest on 
both sides of the fence. The property was actually partitioneJ 
by deed over one year later and no reference to the fence is 
made in the deed. If in fact the agreement was that the fence 
line should be the boundary and such agreement was in fact 
reached prior to the preparation of the deed, then that fence 
should have been used and described in the deed as in facl heic· 
the property line between the parties. The evidence simpl 
not support the proposition that the fence erected in l94H 
erected for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute bet1:ee 11 
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,,, in1ng land owners as required by the doctrine of 
,,rnJarv b:: acquiescence. The unrefuted testimony was that 
er l he vears the main purpose of the fence was to contain 
,[ r J e. 1 •• Jhere a fence is used to contain cattle and is not 
, 11 1 e11cled as a boundary, it cannot set the boundary no matter 
"'··' l r•ng vou place or what uses you make of the property on 
,,,,,~,, r side. See Leon v. Dansie 639 P.2d 730 (Utah 1981); 
<i,,rc:rice v. Highline Equipment Co., 581 P.2d 998 (Utah 1978). 
r~ the Florence case, the court stated 
A fence may be maintained between 
adjoining proprietors for the sake 
of convenience without the intention 
of fixing boundaries. Thus agreement 
to or acquiescence in the establish-
ment of a fence, not as a line marking 
the boundary, but a line for other 
purposes or acquiescence in the mere 
existence of the fence as a mere 
barrier, does not preclude the parties 
from claiming up to the true boundary 
line. 581 P.2d 1000. 
The same situation exists in this case. The fence was erected 
as d convenience to separate animals. It was run from tree to 
tree It was not straight. (TR P.22) The fence was not 
permanent but was taken up in the Spring and put down in the Fall 
Jnd maintained off and on for a period of 30 years as a means 
uf separating animals, a "barrier" as it were for the convenience 
cf the parties. It existed when the partition of the properties 
·'·"s made and the deed prepared. It still exists as fence posts. 
There is not one shred of evidence in the case that all of the 
parties involved ever treated it or agreed or acquiessed in the 
CacL that it be treated as a boundary. In Ringwood v. Bradford, 
Utah 2d., 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court 
,ldted with regard to boundary by acquiescence: 
The theory under which a boundary 
line is established by long acquiescence 
along an existing fence line is founded 
on the doctrine that the parties erect 
the fence to settle some doubt or 
uncertainty which they may have as to 
the location of the true boundary and 
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the (sic) compromise bv agreeing tu 
accept the fence line as the limiting 
line of their respective lands. The 
mere fact that a fence ha~pens to-ne 
put up and neither partyoes anvting 
about it for a long period of time will 
not establish it as the true boundarv. 
269 P.2d 1054 citing Allenn v. Whitncv, 
116 Utah 267, 273, 209 P.2d 257, 260. 
See Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 
34 P.2d 697. (emphasis added) 
In the case of Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d, 156, 389 r. 
143 (1964), the court sets out the four elements necessary t0 l , 
Plaintiff~ proof where the Plaintiff would assert boundarv bv 
acquiescence. These elements are: 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked 
definitely by monuments, fences or buildings. 
2. acquiescence in the line as the boundary 
3. for a long period of years 
4 by adjoining landowners 
The Plaintiff in this case has failed to meet the elements 
required to show a boundary by acquiescence as set forth in the 
Fuoco case, supra. There is not evidence in the case that anvcr:c 
other than J. Harold Mitchell ever considered the fence line to 
be a boundary line. In fact, the evidence says clearly that <Jl'. 
parties used the fence merely as a means of separating their L'-e· 
stock. There is no evidence that the Adams' family ever acqu•Eoc•-
in the fence line as a boundary or that the fence line was ercccc. 
as a means of settling a boundary dispute between adjoining Id~ 
owners. In fact J. Harold Mitchell testified that he had ne\·cr 
discussed with any of the grantees or anyone else who owned the 
property west of him the fact that he considered the fence t0 ~· 
boundary. (TR. P. 57, Ln. 25-P. 58, Ln. 6) The evidence in tee 
case does certainly not perponderate in favor of a finding o: 
"acquiescence" in the line as the boundary for a long peri·•d 
years by adjoining landowners 
The whole concept of the doctrine of Boundary bv Acqu1e-
presupposes the existence of adjoining landowners who ratill'r c· 
go through the expense of surveying the boundary line bet~cen 
their properties, agree to a boundary line and then construe! 
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,;,ime munument which Lhev use to show the boundary line between 
~cir properties and that thev thus acquiess in said boundary 
,., .1 1,ing period of years until the point is reached where both 
·rl 1 ,·~ are bv operation of law precluded from claiming that the 
111 1c!.1rv that they have previously agreed to is not in fact the 
:.1l'.' «vhich separates their property. 
In Lhe present case that situation simply does not exist. 
•.Jfidt we have in the present case is a situation where in fact the 
?r.mertv is jointly owned by J. Harold Mitchell and William Adams. 
As a means of separating out to Mr. Mitchell his undivided interest 
1n the properties, the parties agree that a deed will be prepared 
Jnd that the property share of Mr. Mitchell will be deeded to him. 
"rior to the time that the deed is prepared, the livestock fence 
~,s been erected and used as a means of containing livestock, 
:rr. Mitchell's, for a period of at least one year. The deed is 
then prepared and presented to Mr. Mitchell as his portion of the 
)ruperty by clr. Adams. Mr. ::1itchell would then have us believe 
:hat while he objected to the description, he told Mr. Adams that 
dS long as the fence was the property line, he would accept the 
ieed and have it recorded knowing that the property described 
:~erein was set forth with a metes and bounds description. No 
ot~er person was privy to this alleged conversation and Mr. 
William Adams is now deceased and his mouth is forever closed 
from denying the existence of this alleged agreement to which 
::r :·litchell appears willing to testify. Even were Mr. William 
AJams alive the whole purpose and intent of the parol evidence 
rule and the Statute of Frauds would preclude a party from 
:estifving that such was the case. Clearly if the parties in-
:enJed that the fence were to be the property line, such would 
ha~e and should have been described in the deed. Subsequent 
)urchasers are allowed to rely on the deed as recorded absent 
.'.ear inJications to the contrary. The fact that there existed 
F ll1 vears a livestock fence which was put up in the Spring 
·m·. I cJken down in the Fall on a reasonably regular basis over a 
·crioJ of years would not be sufficient to put one on notice 
'· 0 t said fence was the boundary because it was apparent that 
.~e whole purpose of the fence was a cattle guard to separate 
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cattle and sheep belonging to the parties using the propertv [o· 
grazing purposes. The fact t:1at :ir. Adams is now dead ;rnd ,·:inn· 
even appear at trial to deny the existence of these al 1 e"ed "r : 
parol agreements that the property line is other than as de:· ct:.,. 
in the deed, argues for application of the parol evidence rule 
and the Statute of Frauds in this case. The clear evidence [, 
that the parties accepted the metes and bounds description ~­
set forth in the deed and Mr. Mitchell by accepting the deeJ ace 
recording, based on the metes and bounds description, cannot nm. 
come in and claim that the boundary line is other than what is 
set forth in said deed. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore it is respectfully submitted that the court 
ruled properly in the case and that the judgment of the trial 
court holding that the property line between the properties is 
as described in the deed of September 15, 1949 should be 
affirmed and the Respondents should be awarded their costs 
incurred herein. h 
Respectfully submitted this /~J:.4ay of May, 1984. 
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